Can you find any logical flaws in this statute? 946.41 Resisting or obstructing officer.
(1) Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in an official capacity and with lawful authority, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(2) In this section:
(a) “Obstructs” includes without limitation knowingly giving false information to the officer or knowingly placing physical evidence with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty including the service of any summons or civil process.
(b) “Officer” means a peace officer or other public officer or public employe having the authority by virtue of the officer’s or employe’s office or employment to take another into custody.
(2m) Whoever violates sub. (1) under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class D felony:
(a) The violator gives false information or places physical evidence with intent to mislead an officer.
(b) At a criminal trial, the trier of fact considers the false information or physical evidence.
(c) The trial results in the conviction of an innocent person.
(3) Whoever by violating this section hinders, delays or prevents an officer from properly serving or executing any summons or civil process, is civilly liable to the person injured for any actual loss caused thereby and to the officer or the officer’s superior for any damages adjudged against either of them by reason thereof.
History: 1977 c. 173; 1983 a. 189; 1989 a. 121; 1993 a. 486.
State must prove that accused knew officer was acting in official capacity and knew officer was acting with lawful authority when accused allegedly resisted or obstructed officer. State v. Lossman, 118 W (2d) 526, 348 NW (2d) 159 (1984).
Defendant’s refusal to identify self did not obstruct officer. State v. Hamilton, 120 W (2d) 532, 356 NW (2d) 169 (1984).
Knowingly providing false information with intent to mislead is obstruction as matter of law. State v. Caldwell, 154 W (2d) 683, 454 NW (2d) 13 (Ct. App. 1990).
No law allows officers to arrest for obstruction on a person’s refusal to give his or her name. Mere silence is insufficient to constitute obstruction. Henes v. Morrissey, 194 W (2d) 339, 533 NW (2d) 802 (1995).
Fleeing and hiding from an officer may constitute obstructing. State v. Grobstick, 200 W (2d) 242, 546 NW (2d) 494 (1996)
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The statute generally outlines the offense of resisting or obstructing an officer. Here are some potential logical issues or ambiguities that could be examined:
1. **Definition Overlap and Ambiguity**:
– Subsection (2)(a) defines “obstructs” as giving false information or placing physical evidence with intent to mislead an officer. Subsection (2m)(a) also addresses giving false information or placing physical evidence with intent to mislead, but in a more serious context that leads to a felony charge. The overlap might create ambiguity regarding the distinct scenarios under which each provision applies and how they interact.
2. **Inconsistencies in Mens Rea (Mental State) Requirement**:
– Subsection (1) states that a person must “knowingly” resist or obstruct an officer. However, the statute does not explicitly state that the person must “know” that their resistance or obstruction is against an officer performing duties with “lawful authority.” This could potentially create a defense based on the lack of knowledge regarding the officer’s lawful authority.
3. **Definition of “Officer”**:
– The statute defines “officer” broadly to include peace officers and other public employees with authority to take someone into custody. This broad definition could encompass individuals whose authority to “take another into custody” might be subject to interpretation, potentially leading to legal challenges about who qualifies as an officer under this statute.
4. **Impact of the Obstruction**:
– Subsection (2m) specifies a felony if the obstruction leads to the conviction of an innocent person. This condition introduces causality and requires proving that the false information or evidence was considered by the trier of fact and directly resulted in the wrongful conviction. Proving this chain of events might be challenging and could lead to complications in the prosecution process.
5. **Civil Liability Provisions**:
– Subsection (3) states that hindering, delaying, or preventing an officer from serving or executing any summons or civil process results in civil liability. This provision could be seen as redundant given the criminal penalties outlined, and the statute does not clarify the standard of proof required for establishing civil liability.
6. **Historical Case Interpretations**:
– The statute should be examined in light of historical case law interpretations. For example, case law indicates that mere refusal to identify oneself is not considered obstruction, which could create confusion about what constitutes obstruction in various contexts (e.g., silence vs. providing false information).
7. **Potential for Overbroad Application**:
– The statute’s broad language could potentially lead to overbroad application, where actions not intended to obstruct (e.g., misunderstanding instructions or unintentional non-compliance) could be prosecuted as misdemeanors or felonies.
These points highlight areas where the statute’s clarity, scope, and application might be improved to ensure fair and consistent enforcement.
Carefully Choosing Words 